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A REPLY TO PROFESSOR HICK 
Peter van Inwagen 
In my essay "Non Est Hick,"l I used a political analogy to show that 
there was nothing in principle more "arrogant" about being a Christian 
than there was about being a Burkean conservative, a Rawlsian liberal or 
a Marxist. Commenting on the use I made of this analogy, Professor 
Hick says 
But has van Inwagen not here overlooked the crucial differ-
ences? The Church has traditionally claimed to be "the uniquely 
'correct' one," in the sense of being the sole instrument of salva-
tion. The Church's claim is not about the relative merits of dif-
ferent political systems but about the eternal fate of the entire 
human race. 2 
This is a true statement about the Church's claims,' but I don't see its rel-
evance to my attempt to disarm the charge of arrogance. I have to figure 
out which political beliefs to have ("none" and anarchism being among 
the options). I have to figure out which religious beliefs to have ("none" 
and atheism being among the options).' In either case, if I do adopt a cer-
tain set of beliefs, I have to believe that I and those who agree with me 
are right and that the rest of the world is wrong. The argument that the 
"religious exclusivist" is arrogant rests on the premise that it is arrogant 
to believe that one and those few who agree with one are right and that 
most of the world is wrong (or at least that such a belief is arrogant if it 
is not about one of those matters concerning which the truth is more or 
less demonstrable-a belief, say, about the population of North Dakota 
or the age of the earth). But it follows from this premise-and a few 
well-known facts about the diversity of political opinion-that "political 
exclusivism" is arrogant. (By political exclusivism, I mean having a defi-
nite set of political beliefs not common to all or most of humanity-or 
that plus an adherence to the principle of non-contradiction.') If, there-
fore, it is arrogant to be a religious exclusivist (to have a definite set of 
religious beliefs not common to all or most of humanity and to accept 
the principle of non-contradiction), it is arrogant to be a political exclu-
sivist. What hangs on one's accepting a certain set of beliefs, or what fol-
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lows from their truth, doesn't enter into the question whether it is arro-
gant to accept them. 
It is, in any case, very hard to avoid being a religious exclusivist.6 
Professor Hick is himself a religious exclusivist. My religious beliefs are 
inconsistent with Islam, but so are his (and with popular Hindu polythe-
ism and with ancestor-worship and with ... but practically everyone in 
the world believes something that is inconsistent with his Anglo-
American academic religious pluralism). "Religious pluralism" is not 
the contradictory of religious exclusivism, but one more case of it. 
As I read the passage I have quoted from Professor Hick's paper (and 
the larger passage from which I have excerpted it), it is not an argument for 
the conclusion that I am being arrogant in holding the beliefs I hold. It is 
rather an argument for the conclusion that those beliefs are false. He 
argues, on moral grounds, that a loving God would not establish a geo-
graphically limited Church that was the unique instrument of salvation. 
Hick is, of course, aware that in the essay he is criticizing, I attempted to 
reply to this very argument. My reply was not meant to be particularly 
original-it is, as Hick says, "standard." (He does not call what I say a 
reply. He calls it an evasion. I don't think that's right, for if the statements 
my reply comprises are true, they do answer the "moral" objection to 
God's having established a unique instrument of salvation that is geo-
graphically limited.) Hick's reasoning is essentially this: if, as I claim, I do 
not know what provision God has made for ("involuntary") non-
Christians in His plan of salvation for humanity, I shouldn't claim to know 
that He has not established instruments of salvation outside the Church. 
Why do I claim to know that there are no divinely ordained instru-
ments of salvation (as opposed to things that arise in the world by 
chance and which God may use as instruments in securing the salvation 
of various individuals or classes of people) outside the Church? Let me 
lay aside the question of knowledge, and answer the question why I 
believe this. I believe it because it is a part of my religion, one of the arti-
cles of Christian faith. And not of my religion alone: it is a part of the 
religion of Paul and the Primitive Church and the Apostolic Fathers and 
the Fathers and the scholastics and Luther and Calvin and Cranmer and 
Trent and Wesley and Newman: it is "mere Christianity." I don't see 
how I could coherently give up this belief other than by ceasing to a 
Christian.7 I also believe that nothing concerning the particulars of the 
fate of "involuntary" non-Christians is "mere Christianity." (Many 
Christians, of course, will dispute this. Some think that Universalism is 
implicit in the New Testament. Others think that the damnation of all 
non-Christians, even involuntary ones, is an essential element of the 
Christian faith. I think they're wrong. Well, this is an "in-house" dis-
pute, a dispute about one of those many theological questions concern-
ing which a Christian can do no more than try, with fear and trembling, 
to figure out what to believe.) I do have some beliefs about this, but 
they're tentative and not parts of my faith." What is a part of my faith is 
that God is a righteous Lord and a loving Father, and, therefore, whatev-
er plans He has made for involuntary non-Christians, they will involve 
no injustice; and not only will they involve no injustice, but they will be 
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the work of a love that surpasses human comprehension. Does Professor 
Hick think that, if the Church is the sole instrument of salvation, there is 
no plan that a being of unlimited power and knowledge could devise for 
involuntary non-Christians that would be consistent with His being a 
just Lord and a loving Father? If so, I must once again deplore "the apri-
orism that is an endemic intellectual disease of philosophers and theolo-
gians." 
The University of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
1. In T. Senor (ed.), The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 216-241. The analo-
gy is presented on p. 238. 
2. "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism," Faith and 
Philosophy, 14 (1997): 277-286. 
3. But Professor Hick's syntax-his avoidance of a parallel construction 
where one was natural-makes the position of the Church and any given 
political party or system seem less alike than they are. This syntactical 
device could have been as easily deployed the other way round: "The 
Party's claim is not about the relative merits of different theological systems 
but about the future of the entire human race." 
4. Or I might simply adopt the religious beliefs of my parents or my 
community without ever thinking about the matter. But the same is true of 
my political beliefs. 
5. The qualification is perhaps not otiose. It was, I believe, Ronald Knox 
who identified the essence of Anglicanism as the belief that whenever two 
people accept mutually contradictory propositions, they're both right. 
6. No religious belief is common to all or most of humanity. The only 
way to avoid being a religious exclusivist (other than denying the principle 
of non-contradiction) is therefore to have no religious beliefs. And this is not 
easy. Atheists, of course, have religious beliefs: that God does not exist, if no 
other. And every agnostic with whom I have discussed religious belief has 
the following religious belief: that agnosticism is epistemically preferable to 
theism. 
7. One might, of course, ask why I am a Christian "in the first place." I 
do not propose to enter into this question in a brief note. The interested 
reader may consult my essay "Quam Dilecta" in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), 
God and the Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 31-
60. 
8. Consider the story of Emeth, the young "Calormene" nobleman who 
is a minor character in C. S. Lewis's "Narnia" book, The Last Battle. ('Emeth' 
is a word of biblical Hebrew sometimes translated 'truth'; Lewis's choice of 
this name for his character should be understood in the light of his discus-
sion of the word in Reflections on the Psalms.) If, on another shore, in a greater 
light, it should transpire that (within its limitations; it occurs in a work of 
imaginative fiction written for children) this story had presented a correct 
image of the saving work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of involuntary non-
Christians, I shouldn't be at all surprised. (The religion in which Emeth was 
brought up, the only religion he had ever known, was a religion in which 
evil things were worshiped. And that is the hard case; if one has admitted 
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that the Holy Spirit might work in the way Lewis's story represents Him as 
working in the hearts of men and women brought up to believe in a religion 
that was, in all essentials, devil-worship, one should see no difficulty in the 
thesis that He might work in parallel or analogous ways in the hearts of 
Muslims and Buddhists.) 
